

CREDIBLE DATA NOW INDICATE PLOT WAS UNDER WAY FOR A YEAR

**Nasser-Led Revolt
Broke as Planned —
Only Marine Land-
ings Foiled Fall of
Lebanon, Jordan.**

CPYRGHT

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WASHINGTON, July 18.—It is apparent that the coup d'état in Iraq was not discovered by British, American or Iraqi intelligence. It came as a stunning surprise. In a few hours the three principal figures of the government were murdered, the Baghdad radio station seized, the army chief of staff sent into retirement and a new government was formed and functioning.

The plot had been under way for a year. Like the Egyptian army plot that overthrew King Farouk, it was the work mostly of obscure young army officers, helped by advice and planning from Egypt.

It is now known that Egyptian agents were in constant contact with the plotters in Iraq, as well as with other plotters in Jordan and Lebanon.

Senator Mike Mansfield (Dem.), Montana, in introducing anew his proposal for a joint watchdog committee of the House and Senate to oversee the Central Intelligence Agency, stated:

"It seems clear that there has been a failure somewhere. There are only three possibilities: the necessary information is lacking, or the information is not being properly evaluated here in Washington, or the evaluation is not being properly acted upon by the policy makers."

Direct Word Unavailable.

In the case of Iraq it is now known that direct information was not available. It is also obvious that general information of pro-Nasser and pan-Arab nationalism in Iraq was not properly evaluated and the right conclusions drawn about the stability of the late Iraqi regime.

There was information about the plot against King Hussein of Jordan and the plot to overthrow the government of President Camille Chamoun, of Lebanon.

When the plot to overthrow King Hussein was discovered 50 of the army officers who were involved were arrested. This fell far short of cleaning up the pro-Nasser elements in Jordan's army.

One explanation for the suddenness, secrecy and success of the plot in Iraq was that it went off ahead of time after the discovery of the Jordan conspiracy.

There were ties, communications and common agents between the two plots. Eventually the examination of the arrested officers and agents would have led to discovery of the Iraqi conspiracy.

Other credible information, and this is supported from Cairo, is that the Iraqi revolt was scheduled first and that it did break on precisely the date planned. Iraq was the most important of the three states and if the plot there succeeded, Jordan and Lebanon were expected to fall like the dominoes that President Eisenhower spoke of in advocating help to South Viet Nam.

Nasser's Miscalculations

The chief plotter, United Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel Nasser, did not anticipate that after the fall of the government of King Faisal of Iraq there would be any interference with the conspiracies in Lebanon and Jordan by the United States or Britain.

He miscalculated. United States Marines arrived in Lebanon and British troops landed in Jordan just in time to foil the conspiracies that were supposed to seize power there yesterday.

The intelligence situation in Iraq was especially difficult for the United States. Iraqi Chief of Staff Lieut. Gen. Muhammad Rafiq Arif told the Post-Dispatch last year that there was an Anglo-American memorandum of understanding, according to the terms of which the British and United States officials were to exchange information.

According to Rafiq Arif, the Americans gave the British all the information they had while the British gave the Americans nothing. Rafiq Arif had tried to get the United States to abandon the memorandum.

Britain had been in Iraq for more than 40 years and the British were thought to have first class intelligence sources. British officers were responsible for the training of the Iraqi army and air force. The British-managed Iraq Petroleum Co. was believed to have good intelligence through its sources.

Intrusion Resented

The British were attempting desperately to regain their influence in Iraq and did not like to have the Americans meddling in their special sphere. They hoped to ride back to their former influential position on the coattails of the United States but resented any intrusion in what they considered their province.

Rafiq Arif told the Post-Dispatch that if the Iraqi

were to count on us to back them in their resistance to Communism it was essential that Iraq deal directly with us and not through a British intermediary.

Sir Michael Wright, the British Ambassador to Iraq, carried the ball for Britain. He had served in Washington in the British embassy for years and had many American friends. His personality unquestionably did much to secure American trust in British actions.

In an interview with the Post-Dispatch he was insistent upon how well the British and Americans understood each other and co-operated. But like most servants of the Queen, however, separable they may be in their personal relationships, in the service of the Queen they have the ethics of a counter-intelligence agent.

In a long discussion with an educated but lowly placed Iraqi dealing mainly with the stability of the government, this man told the Post-Dispatch that the situation was stable only so long as Nuri Said, the prime minister murdered by the rebels, remained in power.

Fear of Mob Rule

There were people in the government, he said, who might try to supplant him. There was little chance, he thought, that any of Nasser's followers could succeed him. But he feared mainly that the army and the mob would have the say and would eventually take over.

This is quite different from the optimistic and wishful thinking of American officials in 1958 as expressed in interviews with the Post-Dispatch. If the realities in Iraq, such as were expressed by this informant and other Iraqis, had been evaluated properly in the United States, the revolution might have been anticipated and thwarted.

The Americans know that the British feared United

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Early mission, wanted American arms and training. But that the British would resent it.

These are the conditions that account for the failure of our intelligence. Our officials were required by State Department policy to depend upon the British and not to interfere in their domain. The intelligence estimate of the government was likely to be